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ABSTRACT
This paper describes an engine to optimize web publishers
revenue from second-price auctions, which are widely used
to sell online ad spaces in a mechanism called real-time bid-
ding. This problem is crucial for web publishers, because
setting appropriate reserve prices can increase significantly
their revenue.
We consider a practical setting where the only available
information before an auction occurs consists of a user iden-
tifier and an ad placement identifier. Once the auction has
happened, we observe censored outcomes : if the auction has
been won (i.e the reserve price is smaller than the first bid),
we observe the first bid and the closing price of the auction,
otherwise we do not observe any bid value.
The engine predicts an optimal reserve price for each auc-
tion and is based on two key components: (i) a non-parametric
regression model of auction revenue based on dynamic, time-
weighted matrix factorization which implicitly builds adap-
tive users’ and placements’ profiles; (ii) a non-parametric
model to estimate the revenue under censorship based on an
on-line extension of the Aalen’s Additive Model.
An engine very similar to the one described in this paper is
applied to hundreds of web publishers across the world and
yields a very significant revenue increase. The experimental
results on a few of these publishers detailed in this paper
show that it outperforms state-of-the-art methods and that
it tackles very efficiently the censorship issue.
CCS Concepts
•Mathematics of computing→Probability and statis-
tics; •Applied computing → Online auctions;
Keywords
Online learning; Big-Data; Ad-tech; Real-time; Multi-Armed
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1. INTRODUCTION
Real-time bidding is a mechanism widely used by web
publishers to sell their ad spaces: advertisers can bid in
an auction, and the one bidding the most wins the auction
and displays its ad space. The auction mechanism typically
used is a second-price auction mechanism, where the winning
advertiser pays the second bid.
Publishers set a reserve price, also known as floor price,
under which it chooses not to sell the ad space. If all bids are
under the reserve price, the ad space is not sold. Otherwise,
the first bid wins the auction and the publisher revenue is
the maximum between the second bid and the reserve price.
If f , b1 and b2 are respectively the reserve price and the
two first bids of the auction, the revenue for the publisher
is:
R(f, b1, b2) = 1f≤b1max(f, b2) (1)
Most publishers set the reserve price levels manually on a
daily or weekly basis. We propose in this paper an engine
able to predict an optimal reserve price in real time for each
auction, using the most fresh and relevant data.
We consider the practical setting where the only available
information before the auction takes place consists of iden-
tifiers of the internet user and of the ad placement. Once
the auction has happened, we observe censored outcomes :
if the auction has been won (i.e the reserve price is smaller
than the first bid), we observe the first bid and the closing
price of the auction, otherwise we do not observe any bid
value. This setting gives two different cases of censorship:
(i) if the auction is lost (ie no bid above the reserve price),
nothing is observed; (ii) if the reserve price is paid (closing
price = reserve), then the second bid is not observed. This
incomplete information setting is observed frequently in the
industry.
The following constraints make this prediction problem
very specific and have influenced the way the engine has
been built :
– The bids distributions may vary significantly over time,
due to the specific behavior of each advertiser, which
depends for example on the data sources it uses, its
budget constraint or its bidding algorithm. Thus, the
engine uses time-adaptive users’ and placements’ pro-
files.
– A web publisher has typically several thousands of dif-
ferent ad placements to sell and possibly several hun-
dreds of millions of different visitors. This dimension-
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ality limits the quantity of information stored for each
placement and internet user.
– The information available for each user may be very
sparse, as a lot of them come only a few times on
the publisher websites. The engine must be able to
perform a relevant prediction after a few observations
on a user.
– The reserve price prediction for each auction should be
taken in typically less than 10 ms.
– Finally, the engine must tackle the censorship effects
described above.
Note that we have some kind of“closed-loop”setting when
trying to simultaneously learn the optimal reserve price strat-
egy and, at the same time, compensating for the censored
information that could result from this strategy. There is
an underlying exploration/exploitation trade-off to be con-
trolled, as a too high reserve price could prevent the model
to be updated and improved (because the lack of observed
output in case of censorship), even if it leads to a higher
revenue, as estimated by the current model.
The engine developed in this paper performs a real-time
prediction of the optimal reserve price, depending on the
internet user and the ad placement (adding other features,
such as the time of the day or the user operating system, is
straightforward). This model is estimated on-line on possi-
bly censored data, and the parameters are time-adaptive.
A noticeable advantage of the model used is that its use
is not limited to the second-price auction mechanism : its
extension to any auction mechanism where the outcome of
an auction is a function of the bids is straightforward. This
feature of the engine is used in practice, as some advertising
platforms use non-standard auction mechanisms.
2. RELATED WORK
Revenue maximization of online ad spaces has received
an increasing attention in the machine learning community
during the last decade due to the fast growth of the online
advertising industry [9]. Most of the work addressing this
problem focuses on generalized second-price auctions with
reserve price since it is the prevalent mechanism in industry.
One of the most common assumptions when designing
revenue maximization models is that information about the
user and the placement is available, e.g. the device used by
the user, her geographical location or the content type of the
website. Accordingly, several works have presented regres-
sion models with this kind of information used as features to
predict either the optimal floor or the highest bid (which can
be used indirectly to fix an optimal floor). For instance, [3]
proposed an approach based on gradient boosting decision
trees and mixture models in order to estimate the cumula-
tive distribution function of the highest bid according to a
set of targeting attributes. Also [7] proposed a model to es-
timate the winning bid by means of a Tobit model in order
to perform regression with censored data. This is one of the
few works addressing the problem of censored data which
has a major importance in RTB since lost auctions, even
when not disclosing the values of the bids, provide valuable
information about the interval in which the bids happened.
The main goal of these two works is predicting the first bid
value, and the authors do not propose a strategy to set the
reserve price. From a publisher perspective, however, esti-
mating the optimal reserve price to maximize the revenue is
the chief interest.
Another family of works tries to directly address the op-
timisation problem by transforming the original loss func-
tion (which has very bad properties, as it is non-convex
and non-differentiable) into a surrogate function with nicer
properties. By construction, these methods are paramet-
ric. As the most prominent work of this family, the one
of [5] tries to maximize the revenue by means of a linear
predictor that is found by DC (difference of convex func-
tions) programming. In this case, full access to bid values
is assumed. Later, [6] described a parametric approach to
determine optimal reserve prices in second-price RTB auc-
tions by defining a smoothed revenue function to avoid non-
differentiability. Their method estimates directly the op-
timal floor price through a Expectation-Maximization algo-
rithm that can be used with several regressors. Nevertheless,
this approach is not adaptive, does not consider censorship
and can hardly be used in an on-line setting.
A main drawback of methods relying on models learned
previously on training data is that they do not perform well
under non-stationary environment, which is unfortunately
the case in practice. In fact, the conditions in which they
operate can become very different from those in which they
were trained.
The need of adaptive methods in RTB has led to the ap-
plication of models based on “Multi-armed Bandits” (MAB)
strategies [2, 4]. The model proposed by [4] leverages a con-
textual MAB model which seems very appropriate when us-
ing features, however they do not deal with the uncertainty
resulting from censored data.
A more simple adaptive approach to obtain an optimal
reserve price has been proposed by [8]. They model the
highest bid considering a log-normal distribution and after
observing an auction the model is updated in a Bayesian
fashion. However, the approach remains parametric and re-
lies on the log-normal distribution assumption; moreover, it
doesn’t consider the censorship issue. In the same paper,
the authors described another adaptive method, that basi-
cally maintains an optimal reserve price by increasing it by
a small amount when it is lower than the first bid and by
decreasing it by another small amount when it is larger than
the first bid; this alternative method, despite its simplicity,
turned out to give better performance than the one based
on the log-normal assumption.
To summarize, the main differentiators of our engine rely
on the following features: (i) it tackles time-varying environ-
ment and cold-start problem by incremental on-line model
adaptation; (ii) it uses as sole features the identifiers of the
user and of the ad placement and tackles the sparsity prob-
lems; (iii) it is able to solve the inherent censorship issues
induced by the reserve price selection strategy.
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE PREDICTION EN-
GINE
3.1 Problem Statement
The goal of the proposed method is to predict, before an
auction happens, an optimal reserve price which maximizes
the revenue in expectation. We assume a stream (sequence)
of auctions, so that we can incrementally and adaptively
learn an optimal strategy from previous auction outcomes.
For a given auction, the optimal a posteriori strategy is
to set a floor right below the first bid :
argmax
f
1f≤b1max(f, b2) = b1
But the a priori optimal floor is far from being the expected
first bid, because the cost of not perfectly predicting the first
bid is very skewed – setting a floor right below the first bid
is not costly while setting a floor right above the first bid
leads to a revenue equal to 0. In other words,
argmax
f
E (1f≤b1max(f, b2)) 6= E (b1)
Choosing the expected first bid would be equivalent to min-
imizing a quadratic cost function which is completely differ-
ent from the actual cost profile.
For this reason, we have chosen to adopt a non-parametric
approach and model the whole revenue profile (in expecta-
tion) as a function of the floor instead of modelling the sole
optimal floor. By“non-parametric”model, we mean a model
which does not rely on a pre-specified class of functions (for
modelling the dependence of the revenue with respect to the
reserve price), or to a predetermined distribution or family
of distributions (for modelling the bid distributions). In our
case, non-parametric models are built from a discretization
of the input space. More precisely, we first discretize the
floor space into K bins (or levels) and we model the K val-
ues of the revenue for the K reserve prices, (f (1), ..., f (K)).
To perform a prediction, the engine predicts the floor level
that maximizes the expected revenue.
As we will see, updating the whole revenue profile to take
into account the outcome of a new auction implies that we
can compute the revenue for each floor level, which requires
the knowledge of both the first and second highest bids (b1
and b2). However, such information is not always available:
the information is “fully-censored” (neither b1 nor b2 is ob-
served) when the selected reserve price is higher than the
first bid; the information is “half-censored” (b1 is observed
but not b2) when the selected reserve price is lower than b1
but larger than b2.
The engine tackles censorship by modelling the first and
second bid distributions. When the bid information is cen-
sored, the engine uses the bid distributions to compute the
expected revenue for each floor level; which will then be fed
to the revenue profile modeller as a “proxy” to the real one.
We first describe the revenue profile modeller component
in section 3.3, after having introduced some notations and
definitions. Then, we will describe the bid distribution mod-
eller component in section 3.4. The section 3.5 briefly de-
scribes how to introduce other features than the user’s and
placement’s identifiers. Finally, the section 3.6 assesses the
computational complexity of the engine.
3.2 Observable Inputs and Notations
The observed features before an auction takes place are
the internet user u and the ad placement p identifiers.
We note D a stream of auctions on which the model will be
estimated, and Dt the set of auctions happening before time
t. We denote by Dut and Dpt the set of auctions happening
before time t involving user u and placement p respectively.
Once the auction happens, we observe the following infor-
mation depending on the auction outcome: (i) if the auction
has been won by an advertiser, we observe the reserve price
f , the highest bid b1 and the publisher revenue; (ii) if no
advertiser has won the auction, we only know that the bids
are upper-bounded by the reserve price f .
In the rest of this section, an auction will be denoted by a,
and the corresponding time, internet user and ad placement
will be denoted respectively by ta, ua and pa.
3.3 Building and Updating Revenue Profile Mod-
els
In a nutshell, the method consists in predicting the rev-
enue for any triplet <user u, placement p, reserve price level
f (k)> by latent factor decomposition.
More precisely, for k ∈ J1,KK, the revenue R(k) when the
reserve price f (k) has been set in an auction for an inter-
net user u and an ad placement p is assumed to have the
following latent factor decomposition:
R(k) = β(k) + (X(k)u )
′Y (k)p + 
(k) (2)
where β(k) is a global bias for reserve price level f (k); X
(k)
u
and Y
(k)
p are latent factors columns (of size L) associated
respectively to user u and placement p for reserve price level
f (k); (k) is the decomposition error term at reserve price
level f (k) and is assumed to be gaussian with zero mean and
variance σ2. Note that the prime symbol (′) denotes the
transpose operator;
Before an auction happens, the expected revenuesR(1), ..., R(K)
are predicted, and the reserve price level f (k) which maxi-
mizes the expected revenue is chosen for this auction.
3.3.1 Estimation of the Latent Factors in the Off-line
Case
Suppose that we have observed a set of auctions and their
outcome over the time interval [0, T ], corresponding to the
stream DT . We introduce, for k ∈ J1,KK, the following
loss function corresponding to the estimation problem over
[0, T ]:
L(βˆ(k), Xˆ(k), Yˆ (k)) =
∑
a∈DT
γ(T−ta)(R(k)a − βˆ(k) − (Xˆ(k)ua )′Yˆ (k)pa )2
+
∑
u∈U
‖Xˆu(k) −X(k)0 ‖2Ω +
∑
p∈P
‖Yˆp(k) − Y (k)0 ‖2Γ + ‖βˆ(k) − β(k)0 ‖2Σ
(3)
where:
– the hat symbol (ˆ.) denotes a parameter estimate at time
T ;
– U and P are the sets of all users and placements observed
in the data. We note U and P their sizes;
– Xˆ(k) and Yˆ (k) are the matrices of estimated latent factors
for users and placements respectively (of size U × L and
P × L);
– γ is a forgetting factor (γ < 1). A smaller value for the γ
hyper-parameter implies a greater time-adaptivity for the
latent factors;
– R
(k)
a is the “simulated” publisher revenue when setting the
kth reserve price level (i.e. f (k)) in auction a. If the
two highest bids of auction a, b1 and b2, are observed, it
is simply equal to 1f(k)≤b1max(f
(k), b2), otherwise it is
estimated by the method described in section 3.4;
– ‖.‖2A is the squared Mahalanobis norm with respect to a
covariance matrix A
– The last three terms are regularization terms. The hyper-
parameters X
(k)
0 and Ω have a direct bayesian interpreta-
tion: assuming that the user latent factors have gaussian
priors of mean X
(k)
0 and covariance matrix Ω
′, then Ω is
nothing else than the covariance matrix scaled by the in-
verse observation noise variance: Ω = Ω
′
σ2
. Y
(k)
0 , Γ, β
(k)
0
and Σ have a similar interpretation.
It is worth noting that the regularization of the problem
is more general than the usual formulation where X
(k)
0 =
Y
(k)
0 = 0 and Ω = Γ = λI. In particular, biases per user
and per placement can be estimated with this formulation.
For example, if the ith component of the latent factor Xˆu
(k)
is dedicated to capturing the bias of user u at level k, the
ith component of Y
(k)
0 will be set to 1 and the i
th diagonal
value in Γ is set at (approximately) 0. Conversely, if the jth
component of the latent factor Yˆp
(k)
is dedicated to captur-
ing the bias of placement p at level k, the jth component of
X
(k)
0 will be set to 1 and the j
th diagonal value in Ω is set
at (approximately) 0.
In the sake of notation simplicity, we drop the (k) super-
script here after, knowing that the following equations hold
for each level.
The latent factor estimation is performed using an alter-
nating least-squares method, which consists in estimating
iteratively the factors associated to users assuming that the
factors associated to placements are fixed, and reciprocally.
More precisely, it amounts to iterate the following equations:
for all u ∈ J1, UK, for all p ∈ J1, P K, and for all k ∈ J1,KK:
Xˆu = X0 +
 ∑
a∈Du
T
γ(T−ta)Yˆpa Yˆ
′
pa + Ω
−1
−1
 ∑
a∈Du
T
γ(T−ta)(Ra − βˆ −X ′0Yˆpa)Yˆpa

Yˆp = Y0 +
 ∑
a∈Dp
T
γ(T−ta)XˆuaXˆ
′
ua + Γ
−1
−1
 ∑
a∈Dp
T
γ(T−ta)(Ra − βˆ − Y ′0Xˆua)Xˆua

βˆ = β0 +
 ∑
a∈DT
γ(T−ta) + Σ−1
−1
 ∑
a∈DT
γ(T−ta)(Ra − Xˆ ′ua Yˆpa)

(4)
3.3.2 On-line estimation of the Latent Factors
To estimate the latent factors on-line, we need to keep in
memory the following terms for each user u, placement p
and reserve price level k (the superscript k is still omitted):
– Xu,cov, the time-weighted “covariance” matrix at time T :
Xu,cov
.
=
∑
a∈Du
T
γ(T−ta)Yˆpa Yˆ
′
pa . We define symmetri-
cally Yp,cov;
– Xu,obs, which represents the current estimate at time T
of
∑
a∈Du
T
γ(T−ta)(Ra − βˆ −X ′0Yˆpa)Yˆpa . We define sym-
metrically Yp,obs;
– βcov and βobs defined respectively by βcov
.
=
∑
a∈DT γ
(T−ta)
and βobs
.
=
∑
a∈DT γ
(T−ta)(Ra − Xˆ ′uYˆpa)
With these quantities, it is easy to derive from equation 4
the following update equations, after observing the outcome
of auction a: as in alternating least squares, we iterate until
convergence and for each reserve price level k:
Xˆua = X0 +
(
γ∆tuaXua,cov + Yˆpa Yˆ
′
pa + Ω
−1
)−1
(
γ∆tuaXua,obs + (Ra − βˆ −X ′0Yˆpa)Yˆpa
)
Yˆpa = Y0 +
(
γ∆tpaYpa,cov + XˆuaXˆ
′
ua + Γ
−1
)−1
(
γ∆tpaYpa,obs + (Ra − βˆ − Y ′0Xˆua)Xˆua
)
βˆ = β0 +
(
γ∆tβcov + 1 + Σ
−1
)−1
(
γ∆tβobs + (Ra − Xˆ ′ua Yˆpa)
)
(5)
where ∆t, ∆tua and ∆tpa are respectively the time inter-
vals since the last impression, the last impression for user ua
and the last impression for placement pa. In practice, one
or two iterations are sufficient.
Finally, the following update formulae are applied:
Xua,cov ← γ∆tuaXua,cov + Yˆpa Yˆ ′pa
Xua,obs ← γ∆tuaXua,obs + (R(k)a − βˆ −X ′0Yˆpa)Yˆpa
Ypa,cov ← γ∆tpa × Ypa,cov + XˆuaXˆ ′ua
Ypa,obs ← γ∆tpa × Ypa,obs + (R(k)a − βˆ − Y ′0Xˆua)Xˆua
βcov ← γ∆tβcov + 1
βobs ← γ∆tβobs + (Ra − Xˆ ′ua Yˆpa)
(6)
At each iteration and for each reserve price level, there
are 2 inversions of L× L matrices. These inversions do not
lead to practical problems because L is chosen relatively low
in practice.
Note that using a loss function based on the average least-
squares error 1∑
a∈DT γ
(T−ta)
∑
a∈DT γ
(T−ta)(R(k)a − βˆ(k) −
(Xˆ
(k)
ua )
′Yˆ (k)pa )
2 would lead to much simpler update formulae
with no matrix inversion (thanks to the matrix inversion
lemma). However, the loss function introduced here is much
more adapted to the on-line setting. Indeed, it enables to
give a bayesian interpretation of the regularization: a gaus-
sian prior is assigned to each user/placement latent factors.
The more observations are available for a user or for a place-
ment, the less the prior impacts the latent factor estimation.
3.4 Dealing with Censored Observations
When b1 and b2 are observed for an auction a, it is easy
to compute or, in other words, to simulate the revenue for
any floor level: R
(k)
a = 1f(k)≤b1max(f
(k), b2). Obviously,
this could not be done when the bid values are censored.
This section describes how we still can estimate R
(k)
a with
censored observations. Remember that we have two kinds
of censorships in the data: half and full censorship (section
3.1 )
3.4.1 A Brief Recap of the Aalen’s Additive Regres-
sion Model
Let’s first recall the Aalen’s regression method [1] for left-
censored data, that allows us to estimate the cumulative
hazard rate of a variable – and, consequently, its cumulative
distribution function (CDF) – by means of a set of features
(covariates). Note that, for left-censored data, the term
“‘hazard rate” is an abuse of language, as it is defined here
as the ratio of the probability density function, pdf , over the
cumulative distribution, cdf , while its standard definition is
the ratio pdf/(1 − cdf) (the standard case considers right-
censored data). Given a discretized variable V with values
in the set (v(1), ..., v(K)) , n observations of this variable (vi
with i = 1, . . . , n), and a vector C indicating which of these
observations are (left) censored (Ci is 1 if observation i is
non-censored and 0 when it is censored), the hazard rate of
V at a level v(k) can be modeled as a linear combination of
(p+ 1) features represented by the vector x = (1, x1, ..., xp)
(the first feature aims at capturing the bias which is com-
monly called the “basis hazard rate” in this framework):
λ(v(k)|x) = β(k)0 + β(k)1 x1 + ...+ β(k)p xp (7)
In order to estimate the ((p+ 1)×K) coefficients β(k)j , we
basically solve K linear regression problems as follows: for
k = 1, . . . ,K, we first select the subset Sk of observations
with vi <= v
(k) (either censored or not); we then build the
corresponding feature matrix Xk , of size |Sk|×(p+1), which
is composed of the feature vectors x of the |Sk| observations
and the target vector Yk of size |Sk|×1 that contains 1 for the
non-censored observations with vi = v
(k) and 0 otherwise.
The coefficients are therefore estimated using a standard
regularised least-squares regression method:
β(k) = (X ′kXk + λI)
−1X ′kYk (8)
The coefficients for the cumulative hazard rate can be es-
timated as:
B(k) =
∑
j≥k
β(j) (9)
Then, given an observation with feature vector x, its cu-
mulative hazard rate at level v(k) is given by:
Λ(v(k)|x) = x.B(k) = B(k)0 +B(k)1 x1 + . . .+B(k)p xp (10)
The CDF of the variable V with censored observations
can finally be obtained as:
Φ(v(k)|x) = exp(−Λ(v(k)|x)) (11)
3.4.2 Using Aalen’s regression model to estimate first
and second bids’ distribution
Let’s now consider how Aalen’s regression model could
be used for solving the issue of left-censored observations in
the reserve price optimization problem. In a nutshell, two
Aalen’s regression models will continuously and adaptively
provide the engine with an estimate of the distribution of
the first and the second bid distributions independently. At
any moment, the estimation of both bid probability distri-
butions can be used in order to estimate the expected rev-
enue for different values of the reserve price. Once again,
the models are not parametric, in the sense that they do
not assume any prior distribution, unlike several state-of-
the-art approaches that assume a log-normal distribution
for bids. So, we work on a discretized bid space, using K′
bins (or levels): (b(1), b(2), . . . , b(K
′)). Even if this is not
required, we will assume for simplicity that K = K′ and
that the set of discretized values for b1 and b2 is the same
as for the reserve price (f). Basically, the Aalen’s method
provides an estimate of the CDF at each of these values.
Remarkably, the way the engine maintains probability dis-
tributions over the bids is very similar to the way the engine
is maintaining a revenue estimation for the different levels of
floor: the updates are done for the different discretized lev-
els using a decomposition into latent factors related either
to the user or to the placement (but not to the particular
< user, placement > pair, avoiding some severe sparsity is-
sues). Moreover, the update equations have actually the
same form.
When applying the Aalen’s additive model to estimate the
first bid distribution, we will assume a latent factor model
of the following form: for k ∈ J1,KK, and for an auction for
an internet user u and an ad placement p
λ
(k)
1 = (M
(k)
u )
′N (k)p + η
(k) (12)
where λ
(k)
1 is the hazard rate of the first bid distribution at
level k (bins b(k)); M
(k)
u and N
(k)
p are latent factors columns
(of size L) associated respectively to user u and placement
p for first bid level b(k); η(k) is the decomposition error term
at first bid level b(k) and is assumed to be gaussian with zero
mean and variance σ21 .
All the update equations that will be described hereafter
for the first bid distribution are identical for the second bid,
except for some details which we will mention explicitly.
As we did for the revenue latent factor estimation, we
introduce, for k ∈ J1,KK, the following loss function for the
estimation problem over [0, T ]:
L(Mˆ (k), Nˆ (k)) =
∑
a∈D(k)
T
γ
(T−ta)
1 (C
(k)
a − (Mˆ (k)ua )′Nˆ (k)pa )2
+
∑
u∈U
‖Mˆu(k) −M (k)0 ‖2Ω1 +
∑
p∈P
‖Nˆp(k) −N (k)0 ‖2Γ1
+‖η(k) − η(k)0 ‖2
(13)
where:
– D(k)T is the set of auctions up to time T whose first bid or
its left-censored value is smaller or equal to level b(k); in
other words, this is the set of historical auctions for which
max(b1, fa) ≤ b(k) (fa is the floor for auction a);
– C
(k)
a = 1 if the first bid is uncensored AND if the bid
belongs to the bin b(k); C
(k)
a = 0 otherwise;
– Mˆ (k) and Nˆ (k) are the matrices of estimated first bid la-
tent factors for users and placements respectively (of size
U × L and P × L);
– γ1 is a forgetting factor (γ1 < 1);
– The last two terms are regularization terms and have a
direct bayesian interpretation (section 3.3).
Note that, if we consider the second bid distribution, these
definitions should be adapted in the following way:
– D(k)T is the set of auctions up to time T whose second bid
or its left-censored value is smaller or equal to level b(k);
in other words, this is the set of historical auctions for
which max(b2, fa) ≤ b(k) (fa is the floor for auction a);
– C
(k)
a = 1 if the second bid is uncensored and if this bid
belongs to the bin b(k); C
(k)
a = 0 otherwise;
As before, the latent factor estimation is performed using
an alternating least-squares method. We directly give the
update equations for the on-line setting, as they constitute
the core of the proposed methods.
So, in order to estimate the latent factors on-line, we need
to keep in memory the following terms for each user u, place-
ment p and bid level k :
– M
(k)
u,cov, the time-weighted “covariance” matrix at time T :
M
(k)
u,cov
.
=
∑
a∈Du,(k)
T
γ(T−ta)Nˆ (k)pa Nˆ
(k)′
pa . We define sym-
metrically N
(k)
p,cov. Note the difference with respect to
equation 5: the sum is over the set Du,(k)T , meaning the
set of all historical auctions where user u appeared and
for which max(b1, fa) ≤ b(k);
– M
(k)
u,obs, which represents the current estimate at time T
of
∑
a∈Du,(k)
T
γ(T−ta)(C(k)a −M (k)
′
0 Nˆ
(k)
pa )Nˆ
(k)
pa . We define
symmetrically N
(k)
p,obs.
With these quantities, the following update equations, af-
ter observing the outcome of auction a, are iterated until
convergence and for each bid level k:
Mˆ (k)ua = M
(k)
0 +
(
γ
∆t
(k)
ua
1 M
(k)
ua,cov + Nˆ
(k)
pa Nˆ
(k)′
pa + Ω
−1
1
)−1
(
γ
∆tua
1 M
(k)
ua,obs
+ (C(k)a −M (k)
′
0 Nˆ
(k)
pa )Nˆ
(k)
pa
)
Nˆ (k)pa = N
(k)
0 +
(
γ
∆t
(k)
pa
1 N
(k)
pa,cov + Mˆ
(k)
ua Mˆ
(k)′
ua + Γ
−1
1
)−1
(
γ
∆tpa
1 N
(k)
pa,obs
+ (C(k)a −N (k)
′
0 Mˆ
(k)
ua )Mˆ
(k)
ua
)
(14)
where ∆t
(k)
ua and ∆t
(k)
pa are respectively the time intervals
since the last impression for user ua and the last impres-
sion for placement pa, restricted to past auctions for which
max(b1, fa) ≤ b(k) . In practice, one or two iterations are
sufficient.
Finally, the following update formulae are applied:
M (k)ua,cov ← γ
∆t
(k)
ua
1 M
(k)
ua,cov + Nˆ
(k)
pa Nˆ
(k)′
pa
M
(k)
ua,obs
← γ∆t
(k)
ua
1 M
(k)
ua,obs
+ (C(k)a −M (k)
′
0 Nˆ
(k)
pa )Nˆ
(k)
pa
N (k)pa,cov ← γ
∆t
(k)
pa
1 ×N (k)pa,cov + Mˆ (k)ua Mˆ (k)
′
ua
N
(k)
pa,obs
← γ∆t
(k)
pa
1 ×N (k)pa,obs + (C
(k)
a −N (k)
′
0 Mˆ
(k)
ua )Mˆ
(k)
ua
(15)
3.4.3 Revenue Profile Estimation from the Estimated
Bid Distributions
We can derive the CDF of b1 and b2, from their haz-
ard rates: for instance, the CDF of b1, denoted by Φ1(b
(k))
can be computed as: Φ1(b
(k)|u, p) = exp(−∑j≥k λ(j)1 (u, p)).
The CDF of b1 and b2 can then be used to estimate the ex-
pected revenue at each discrete value of the floor price and
this estimate is then used to feed the Revenue Profile Mod-
eller.
Let’s first consider the full censorship case (b2 ≤ b1 ≤
fa where fa is the floor selected for the current auction
a). Since the revenue is given by R(f, b1, b2) = b21b2>f +
f1b2≤f≤b1 , the expected revenue in the continuous case can
be estimated as:
E(R(f, b1, b2|b2 ≤ b1 ≤ fa)) =∫ fa
f
P (b2 > t|b2 ≤ b1 ≤ fa)dt+ fP (f ≤ b1|b2 ≤ b1 ≤ fa)
'
∫ fa
f
P (b2 > t|b2 ≤ fa)dt+ fP (f ≤ b1|b2 ≤ b1 ≤ fa)
(16)
Details of the derivation can be found in equation (2) of [5].
The second equation emphasizes the approximation that al-
lows us to model independently the first and second distri-
butions, instead of modelling the joint distributions. Exper-
imentally, this approximation could be shown to have virtu-
ally no impact on the computation of the expected revenue,
at least with the auction datasets we used.
This second equation can be converted for the discrete
case into the following equation:
∀f (k) < fa, Eb1,b2(R(f (k), b1, b2|b2 ≤ b1 ≤ fa)) =
fa∑
k′=k
f (k
′)φ˜2(b
(k′))− f (k).(1− Φ˜2(f (k))) + f (k).(1− Φ˜1(f (k)))
(17)
where Φ˜1 and Φ˜2 are the re-normalised c.d.f.’s of the first
and second bid respectively, conditioned by the fact that
they should be smaller than fa: Φ˜1(f) =
Φ1(f)
Φ1(fa)
, Φ˜2(f) =
Φ2(f)
Φ2(fa)
with Φ1 and Φ2 the (non-conditional) c.d.f.’s of the
first and second bid respectively, while φ˜2 is the (discrete)
renormalised p.d.f of the second bid corresponding to the Φ˜2
CDF. For levels f (k) ≥ fa, the revenue is equal to 0.
For the half-censored case (b1 observed and fa ≤ b1), this
formula becomes:
Eb2(R(f
(k), b1, b2|b2 ≤ fa)) =
fa∑
k′=k
f (k
′)φ˜2(b
(k′))− f (k).(1− Φ˜2(f (k))) + f (k) ∀f (k) < fa
(18)
For levels f (k) ≥ fa, the revenue is not “censored” and is
equal to f (k) if f (k) ≤ b1 and 0 otherwise.
3.5 Introduction of additional features
We detail briefly how to introduce contextual features
other than the user’s and placement’s identifier into the
model , e.g. the time of the day or the user’s device. Let’s
θ be the corresponding feature vectors. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we assume that the dependency between the feature
vector and the revenue is linear and that it simply combines
additively with the biases and latent factors:
R(k) = β(k) + (X(k)u )
′Y (k)p + θ
′Z(k) + (k) (19)
In this setting, the formulae to estimate β(k) and the latent
factors X
(k)
u and Y
(k)
p are kept unchanged, except that R
(k)
is replaced by (R(k)−θ′Z(k)). It is straightforward to derive
the formulae to estimate adaptively the parameters Z(k): it
is similar to the update equations of β(k), except that it uses
θ as regressor, instead of the 1 constant.
3.6 Computational complexity of the engine
Let K be the number of reserve price levels, L be the size
of the latent factors space and I be the number of iterations
performed when updating the latent factors.
The most computationally expensive operations are the
updates of the latent factors used in the revenue profile and
bid distribution modellers. These updates require a L × L
matrix inversion for each iteration and for each reserve price
level, i.e K × I matrix inversions.
In practice, an appropriate value for K is around 100, and
5 for I. L is also low (see section 4), which makes the engine
suitable in real applications.
4. RESULTS
In this section we describe results obtained from compar-
ing our method with baseline approaches that are appropri-
ate for the task and also with state-of-the-art methods that
have been proposed recently in the literature.
The evaluation is performed on a real advertising pub-
lisher dataset containing more than 4.4 millions of auctions
data collected over one week. It contains 367K unique users
and 2K unique placements, as well as the first and second
bid values (non-censored) of each auction which provides the
ground truth to evaluate our method with respect to the full
information (non-censored) setting.
The dataset is divided into two subsets: the training set
(containing the first 3 days of observations, approximately
3/7 of the total number of observations) and the test set.
The results given below are estimated on the test set.
For all the evaluations, the metric to measure peformance
is the resulting revenue. It is a reasonable measure since the
primary goal is to maximize the revenue, conversely to other
works [7] which try to predict the highest bid in which case
the estimation error is a more appropriate metric.
Initially, the revenue achieved when applying the reserve
price predicted by the model is compared to the following
two reserve price setting baselines:
– NO RES: reserve price equal to 0;
– PL RES: setting an optimal reserve price per placement
determined on the training set (using uncensored bid val-
ues);
– PL RES ONLINE: setting an optimal reserve price per
placement which is estimated online as the reserve price
maximizing an exponentially-weighted moving average of
the revenue (using uncensored bid values)
We consider 3 settings:
S1: The ideal one (or easy one), where the training is
uncensored (but the test set is censored); at the end of the
training phase, as usual, the identified values of the latent
factors are used as initial values when starting the test phase;
S2: The hard one, where both the training and test sets
are censored; note that the censorship of the training set
is fixed to the historical prices and could not be modified,
while the censorship level in the test set could be controlled
by the reserve price optimisation strategy (we use the knowl-
edge of both b1 and b2 to simulate the revenue of the pro-
posed strategies); moreover, we assume that the training set
could be used only as a “development set” to tune the hyper-
parameters, but not to initialise the values of the latent fac-
tors (as if a reset operation has been applied just before
the test set); the goal of this constraint is to emphasize the
“cold-start” and adaptive capabilities of our algorithm;
S3: An intermediate one, where only the test set is cen-
sored; but here also, we assume that the training set could
be used only as a “development set” to tune the hyper-
parameters, but not to initialise the values of the latent
factors.
Besides the two baselines, we consider 4 variants of our
method:
M1: The complete one, using both the revenue profile
modeller and the bid distribution modeller when the bid
information is censored
M2: A variant where only the revenue profile modeller
is used and, to handle the censorship issue, we arbitrarily
fix b1 and b2 to 0 in case of full censorship, and b2 equal
to fa in case of half-censorship; intuitively, this amounts to
never favouring “higher” levels of floor in case of censorship
so that we can promote exploration of low levels of floor
(remember that, when we know the revenue for a floor, we
automatically know the revenue for all floors that are larger
than this floor). So, this is an indirect way of controlling the
exploration/exploitation trade-off;
M3: A variant where only the revenue profile modeller is
used and, to handle the censorship issue, we simply skip it,
meaning that we do not update the revenue profile for the
part which is unknown due to censorship (but we update it
for all levels that are larger or equal to the current reserve
price);
M4: the same variant as M3, but instead of selecting
the reserve price whose predicted expected revenue is the
largest, we consider the Lin-UCB selection strategy.
Only (M1) uses the bid distribution modeller component.
In the update equations of the adaptive methods, the pa-
rameters (biases and latent factors) were initialised to small
random values (gaussian with 0.1 variance).
The performances of the different methods, namely the av-
erage revenues on the Test Set (in arbitrary monetary units)
are given in the following table:
S1 S2 S3
NO RES 2.5978 N/A N/A
PL RES 3.6222 N/A N/A
PL RES ONLINE 3.7154 N/A N/A
M1 4.0663 3.9955 3.9957
M2 3.9012 3.7948 3.7936
M3 3.8954 3.7369 3.7468
M4 3.9306 3.821 3.8209
Oracle (knowing b1) 8.6552
Some remarks about the results and the choice of the
hyper-parameters:
– Starting the model from scratch at the beginning of the
test set finally has a small impact on the performance; this
is not surprising, knowing that there are a lot of “flash”
users (i.e. new users who never appeared before and will
disappear a few minutes later) for which solving the cold-
start problem is crucial;
– A censored training set is not detrimental to performance:
results are nearly the same than with a uncensored train-
ing set;
– In the case of both training and test sets uncensored (so
that no censorship-dealing strategy should be used), the
revenue profile modeller gives a performance of 4.163 (4.1294
if we apply a “reset” operation before the test set, to em-
phasize cold-start performance). The method M1 is rela-
tively close to this level of performance and it shows that
the bid distribution modeller performs well;
– The hyper-parameters are determined using grid-search
(6 discrete values per hyper-parameter on a logarithmic
scale, from 10−6 to 10−1 for the forgetting factors and
from 100 to 105 for the constant diagonal covariance pri-
ors), focusing on the ones that give the best average rev-
enue on the training set. Optimal results are reached when
the observations are forgotten after a few minutes for users
and a few hours for placements;
– The dimension of the latent space can be kept low (in our
case 2): once the latent factors corresponding to user and
placement biases are added in the model, adding new la-
tent factors does not improve very significantly the results
to the price of a high complexity. This comes probably
from the relatively low number of observations per user,
which improves the risk of over-fitting if the dimension is
too large. The optimal value for the latent space dimen-
sion is probably dependent on the dataset
Finally, we have compared our method with three state-of-
the-art approaches: the one based on a Bayesian smoothing
of the revenue function (the parametric approach based on
an EM -like algorithm as described in [6]), the one based on
an assumed log-normal distribution of the first bid [8] and
the one based on the simple adaptation mechanism (“in-
crease the floor when it is below the first bid; decrease it
when it is larger”), as described in [8] but extended to main-
tain one optimal floor value per placement. Note that the
former method is not adaptive (the parameters are fixed
after a training phase), while the last two methods are.
Both methods assume that the bid information is uncen-
sored. Therefore, in order to keep the comparison fair, we
compared these benchmark methods with ours in the full in-
formation setting (training and test sets uncensored). The
average revenues on the test set are summarized in the fol-
lowing table:
S1
Bayesian Smoothing (non-adaptive) 2.893
Log-Normal Bid Distribution (adaptive) 2.932
Simple Bi-directional Inc/Dec (adaptive) 3.627
M1 4.163
The relatively poor performance of our benchmark meth-
ods most probably comes from the fact that their underly-
ing assumptions are violated in practice. Indeed, as far as
method [8] is concerned, assuming a log-normal distribution
for the first bid and taking the mean minus a small constant
for setting the reserve price is a too simplistic strategy, due
to the high skewness of the revenue function as we explained
before. For the Bayesian smoothing method of [6], consid-
ering that the optimal reserve price could be expressed as a
linear function of the available features – which means here
that it could be expressed as the sum of a user weight and
a placement weight – seems also to be too simplistic. Note
that this method uses only P +U parameters (when only in-
formation available is the user identifier and the placement
identifier), while our method uses K.(P + U) parameters;
moreover, this method does not take into account the time-
varying aspects of the problem and this also explains its
low performance. The simple adaptive “increase/decrease”
method turned out to be only slightly superior to the non-
adaptive PL RES strategy, implying that the adaptation
mechanism did not really succeed in capturing the time-
varying properties of the first bid distribution.
We have also measured the practical efficiency of the pro-
posed method in terms of CPU response time using a stan-
dard computer (µP 3.50GHz, RAM 8GB). Updating the full
model(M1 above) and estimating the optimal floor price in
the worst case (under full censorship) requires only 0.38 ms,
and even less without censorship (0.21 ms). This is far be-
low the limit of 10ms at which the optimal floor must be
decided.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIREC-
TIONS
Deploying a revenue maximization engine through the op-
timal setting of the reserve price for real-time-bidding auc-
tions remains a challenging industrial problem: the “very
short latency” constraint with its implication on the algo-
rithm complexity, the sparsity of user and placement infor-
mation and, last but not least, the highly time-varying en-
vironment all raise strong issues to be solved. In this paper,
we adopt a non-parametric approach to adaptively predict
the revenue profile for each floor level by an on-line matrix
factorisation approach. To compensate for the lack of full
bid information due to the intrinsic censorship of the auc-
tion mechanism, we propose to use a similar approach for
predicting the first and second bid distributions through the
Aalen’s additive regression model. We validated this ap-
proach by deploying the engine on a real dataset, including
millions of auctions over a time period of one week: results
show that the proposed approach outperforms state-of-the-
art methods and, in particular, that the average revenue
nearly reaches the level of the non-censored setting.
The model can be extended to deal with more complex
non-linear interactions than the one assumed by a simple
matrix factorization, especially when some extra user or
placement features are available, keeping in mind that the
real-time constraints could give some restriction on the class
of models in practice.
Finally, a more global game-theoretic approach should be
adopted, by considering the case where the bidders’ strate-
gies could themselves evolve over time when they observe the
reserve price setting strategy: this introduces some closed-
loops that makes the problem much harder to solve.
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